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OHIO‘S ―PREGNANCY-BLIND‖ LEAVE POLICY: THE PUBLIC 
POLICY RAMIFICATIONS OF MCFEE V. NURSING CARE 
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA 
Jessica Monroe* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 2010 women became the majority on the nation‘s 
payrolls for the first time in United States history.
1
  Most women in the 
workforce will become pregnant at some point in their working lives,
2
 
making employers‘ treatment of pregnant women an extremely 
significant national issue. 
Take, for example, the case of Tiffany McFee, who requested leave 
from her job as a nurse due to a pregnancy-related condition.
3
  Instead of 
granting her request, her employer, Pataskala Oaks, fired her six days 
after she went on leave and only three days after giving birth to her 
child.
4
  McFee had worked at Pataskala Oaks for eight months, but her 
employer‘s policy required a year of service before allowing employees 
to take unpaid leave.
5
  The Supreme Court of Ohio held that her 
termination did not constitute pregnancy discrimination because her 




This Casenote will analyze the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s recent 
decision in McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America
7
 as 
evidence of the long overdue change needed in pregnancy 
 
 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank her family, Saul Meyerson-Knox, and Chelsea Devine for their support and encouragement.  
The author would also like to thank her colleagues on the University of Cincinnati Law Review for their 
guidance. 
 1. Zoe Savitsky, Inertia and Change: Findings of The Shriver Report and Next Steps, 25 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 172, 173 (2010). 
 2. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 
567, 579 (2010). 
 3. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 
2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 2010). 
 7. Id. 
1
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discrimination law.  The current state of the law fails to promote gender 
equality in the workplace because the law insists on ignoring that only 
women become pregnant and risk losing their jobs because of 
pregnancy.  Until the law takes into account the medical and social 
realities of pregnancy, women will not truly have equal opportunity in 
employment.  By admitting that pregnancy is not a ―disability,‖ society 
can cease comparing pregnant workers to nonpregnant workers and start 
building a framework for pregnancy policies that benefit women, 
families, and businesses. 
Part II of this Casenote provides a brief background of the federal 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and relevant cases interpreting the 
legislation.  Part II then describes Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination law.  
Part III summarizes the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in McFee.  
Part IV considers the opinion‘s arguments as well as its problematic 
public policy ramifications.  Finally, Part V concludes that in light of the 
decision in McFee, legislative action is needed to protect Ohio workers 
from pregnancy discrimination. 
II. THE PDA, FMLA, AND RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Several pieces of state and federal legislation, fueled by numerous 
and sometimes conflicting approaches, have attempted to protect 
employees from pregnancy discrimination.  This Part will provide a 
summary of pregnancy discrimination law and precedent relevant to the 
arguments made in McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America.  
Subpart A provides a brief overview of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and relevant case law.  Next, subpart B briefly explains how the 
Family and Medical Leave Act attempted to address the shortcomings of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.  Finally, subpart C provides a general 
overview of Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination laws and their application 
in Ohio courts. 
A. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to equalize 
employment opportunities and remove ―artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
2
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invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification[s].‖8  Title VII included sex as a protected category; 
however, the statute did so without much consideration for whether, or 
how, it would provide pregnancy protections in employment.9  In the 
early 1970s, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
began to rule pregnancy leave should be granted regardless of employer 
policies on leave for illness.10  EEOC regulations provided that 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy could violate Title VII by: (1) 
denying women access to work because of pregnancy, (2) firing or 
refusing to hire a woman because of her pregnancy, or (3) prohibiting 
women from taking leave or providing inadequate leave that resulted in 
the employee‘s termination.11  One theory behind the EEOC regulations 
is that providing no leave or inadequate leave violated Title VII due to 
the disparate impact of the policy on women.12  In effect, the EEOC 
provisions of 1972 allowed women to take pregnancy leave even when 
employers offered no leave at all.13 
These provisions did not survive very long.  In Geduldig v. Aiello, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that excluding pregnancy from 
a temporary disability insurance plan did not violate Title VII because 
the denial of benefits was not based on sex.14  In 1976, the Supreme 
Court followed Geduldig and overturned the EEOC regulations 
interpreting Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.  In Gilbert, the 
Court held that an employer‘s exclusion of benefits for pregnancy was 
not sex discrimination under Title VII.15  The majority reasoned the plan 
excluding pregnancy was not discriminatory against women because 
there ―is no risk from which men are protected and women are not . . . it 
 
 8. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–431 (1971); see also McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973). 
 9. Ann O‘Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 18 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 20. 
 11. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a)–(c) (1979); see also O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 21. 
 12. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 21. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2006). 
 15. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2006). 
3
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is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this 
scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not 
receive benefits.‖16 
In response to Gilbert and Geduldig, Congress passed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978, explicitly including discrimination 
based on pregnancy as a violation of Title VII.17  The PDA states that 
discrimination ―because of sex‖ includes discrimination ―on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.‖18  The PDA 
provides that women affected by pregnancy and related conditions 
―shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as 
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to 
work.‖19  Congress added the PDA to Title VII to ensure that women 
would not be hindered in job advancement because of pregnancy.20  The 
legislative history accompanying the PDA expresses congressional 
intent to achieve the ―full realization of equal employment 
opportunity.‖21 
Shortly after the passage of the PDA, a Montana district court 
interpreted the PDA to incorporate the disparate impact theory in Miller-
Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry.22  The court stated 
that a one-year service requirement for disability leave would leave an 
employer subject to a disparate impact claim by pregnant women.  
While this decision was vacated and remanded as a state law issue,23 the 
Montana court handling the remand maintained that the employer‘s no-
leave policy violated the PDA and the state maternity statute under a 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 22. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Jamie L. Clanton, Note, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at Work: 
Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What It Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703, 726 (2001) (citing Samuel 
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands of 
Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2181 (1994)). 
 21. Clanton, supra note 20, at 727 (citing Staff of Senate Comm. On Labor and Human 
Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 iii 
(Comm. Print 1980)). 
 22. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r. of Labor and Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (D. Mont. 
1981), vacated and dismissed, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982), remanded, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984). 
 23. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r of Labor and Indus., 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982), 
remanded, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984). 
4
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disparate impact theory.24  In another case, Abraham v. Graphic Arts 
International Union, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted that ―[a]n 
employer can incur a Title VII violation as much by lack of an adequate 
leave policy as by unequal application of a policy it does have.‖25 
In California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld a California statute requiring employers to 
provide up to four months of unpaid pregnancy disability leave.26  The 
Court determined that Congress intended the PDA to be the minimum 
protection for pregnant workers, not a ceiling preventing states from 
taking further measures.27  The Supreme Court further held that the PDA 
does not require preferential treatment for pregnant workers.  Instead, 
the Court stated the PDA allows measures that advance the legislation‘s 
purpose of achieving equal employment opportunity for women.28 
Despite the Court‘s ruling in Guerra, more recent decisions have held 
that Title VII allows facially neutral leave policies despite their failure 
to provide any pregnancy leave.  For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected a disparate impact claim based on a policy allowing 
only three days of leave within the first ninety days of employment.29  
Other circuit cases have denied protection to pregnant workers on the 
grounds that the PDA does not require employers to treat pregnant 
workers better than other workers.30  Advocates soon realized that new 
legislation was necessary to provide job protection for pregnant women, 
and Congress responded by enacting the Family and Medical Leave 
Act.31 
 
 24. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Comm‘r of Labor and Indus., 692 P.2d 1243, 1251–52 (Mont. 
1984). 
 25. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int‘l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 26. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 276–92 (1987). 
 27. Id. at 285. 
 28. Id. at 286–89. 
 29. Stout v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the claim that 
all or substantially all pregnant women would by negatively impacted by the policy, reasoning that such 
a holding would ―transform the PDA into a guarantee of medical leave for pregnant employees, 
something we have specifically held the PDA does not do‖). 
 30. See e.g., Troupe v. May Dep‘t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 31. See Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-
Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 468 (2008). 
5
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B. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) guarantees up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year for the birth or care of an 
employee‘s child.32  The FMLA was motivated by the decision in 
Guerra, which had struck down the California statute mandating four 
months of unpaid pregnancy leave.33  Congressman Berman, author of 
the California legislation, called for federal laws to guaranteeing 
pregnant women the right to take temporary disability leave without 
losing their jobs.34  However, this request reignited the strict equality 
versus accommodation debate among feminists.35  Feminists supporting 
a strict equality approach worried accommodation statutes would lead to 
implicit discrimination against women of childbearing age because the 
potential for leave would make them more expensive to hire.36  Other 
feminist advocates saw an accommodation model as a way to ensure 
women had an equal opportunity to participate in the job market.37 
The House of Representatives recognized that the limited protections 
provided by the PDA were inadequate for workers whose employers did 
not offer leave or disability policies and designed the FMLA to fill the 
gaps remaining in the PDA.38  However, by the time the FMLA was 
actually enacted, it had lost this focus.  Lobbying for small business 
exemptions, part-time employee exemptions, and a one-year 
 
 32. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611–2612 (West 2011). 
 33. Ann O‘Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 39 (2007). 
 34. Tamar Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is It Leave, Indeed?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1984, § 3, at 1, 
col. 2. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; see also Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). 
 37. Lewin, supra note 34.  The article quotes San Francisco's Employment Law Center attorney 
Linda Krieger, ''We are the only industrialized nation that doesn't provide paid maternity leave as a 
matter of national policy . . . .  I don't see why it should be illegal sex discrimination to fire a woman 
because she gets pregnant, but acceptable to tell her she loses her job if she takes off a few weeks for 
childbirth.  In the real world, it's the same thing.  The point isn't that men and women must be treated 
alike, it's that they must have equal opportunities.  When it comes to pregnancy, equal treatment means 
inequality for women.''  Lewin, supra note 34; see also Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The 
Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 513 (1983). 
 38. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 18. 
6
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probationary period for FMLA eligibility chopped away provisions 
necessary to protect many workers, especially in jobs more often held by 
women.39  Despite the positive changes the FMLA created, it still does 
not cover employers with less than fifty employees or part-time 
workers.40  The workers not covered by the FMLA disproportionally 
include women and lower-income workers.41  Women are also less 
likely to meet the one-year service requirement, since childbearing and 
other family needs make women more likely to change jobs or come in 
and out of the work force.42  In total, the FMLA only covers 46% of 
workers.43 
C. Ohio Law 
Ohio‘s version of Title VII, Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A), 
provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any employer 
to refuse to hire a person, discharge a person without just cause, or 
otherwise discriminate against a person with respect to terms or 
conditions of employment because of the person‘s sex.44 
In 1980, the Ohio General Assembly adopted § 4112.01(B), Ohio‘s 
version of the PDA, articulating that ―because of sex‖ in § 4112.02(A) 
means ―because of or on the basis of pregnancy, any illness arising out 
of and occurring during the course of a pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.‖45 
Section 4112.04(A)(4) empowers the Ohio Civil Rights Commission 
(OCRC) to adopt ―rules to effectuate the provisions of [§ 4112] and the 
policies and practice of the commission in connection with this 
chapter.‖46  Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05 clarifies the rights of 
 
 39. Id. at 43–45.  One-fourth of employed women work part time, compared to only one-tenth of 
employed men, and women constitute two-thirds of the part-time workforce.  Id. 
 40. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611–2612 (West 2011). 
 41. O‘Leary, supra note 9, at 39. 
 42. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-
Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 475 (2008). 
 43. Id. 
 44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(B) (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2010). 
7
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pregnant employees under Chapter 4112.47  Section 4112-5-05(G)(2) 
provides, ―Where termination of employment of an employee who is 
temporarily disabled due to pregnancy or a related medical condition is 
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no 
maternity leave is available, such termination shall constitute unlawful 
sex discrimination.‖48  While § 4112-5-05(G)(2) seemingly mandates 
maternity leave, paragraph (G)(5) of the same rule contemplates an 
employer instituting a minimum length of service requirement.49  
Paragraph (G)(5) specifies that when an employee qualifies for leave, 
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for 
leave.  The rule elaborates: ―For example, if the female meets the 
equally applied minimum length of service requirements for leave time, 
she must be granted a reasonable leave on account of childbearing.‖50 
Any perceived inconsistency between these provisions could be resolved 
by paragraph (G)(6), which provides, ―Notwithstanding paragraphs 
(G)(1) to (G)(5) of this rule, if the employer has no leave policy, 
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for 
leave of absence for a female employee for a reasonable period of 
time.‖51 
 
 47. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05 (2010). 
 48. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(2) (2010). 
 49. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(5) (2010) (―Women shall not be penalized in their 
conditions of employment because they require time away from work on account of childbearing.  
When, under the employer's leave policy the female employee would qualify for leave, then 
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for leave of absence for female 
employees for a reasonable period of time.  For example, if the female meets the equally applied 
minimum length of service requirements for leave time, she must be granted a reasonable leave on 
account of childbearing.  Conditions applicable to her leave (other than its length) and to her return to 
employment shall be in accordance with the employer's leave policy.‖). 
 50. Id. 
 51. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(6) (2010).  In 2004, the OCRC adopted Technical 
Policy T-29 which created a rebuttable presumption that a twelve week leave is reasonable and 
sufficient.  See Thomas H. Barnard and Adrienne L. Rapp, Pregnant Employees, Working Mothers and 
the Workplace—Legislation, Social Change and Where We Are Today, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 197, 220 
(2009).  This Casenote will not address the controversy in 2007 and 2008 over the OCRC‘s attempts to 
define a ―reasonable period of time‖ for pregnancy leave required by R.C. 4112 as twelve weeks, since 
such a provision would be obsolete after the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in McFee that employers have to 
offer pregnancy leave only to the extent they offer other disability leave.  See James Nash, Pregnancy-
leave Change Still Unresolved, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec. 31, 2008), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2008/12/31/CIVIL.ART_ART_12-31-
08_B1_PLCCQH9.html.   James Nash, Maternity Leave Plan Shot Down, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Dec. 
8
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State and federal courts interpreted these rules to require reasonable 
maternity leave, whether or not the employer had a disability leave 
policy.52  In McConaughy v. Boswell Oil, Ohio‘s First District Court of 
Appeals held that under § 4112-5-05(G)(5)-(6), a female employee must 
be granted reasonable maternity leave regardless of internal policy.53  
 Additionally, the Southern District of Ohio noted in Woodworth v. 
Concord Management that ―[d]enial of maternity leave mandated by the 
Ohio Administrative Code ‗is, in effect, terminating the employee 
because of her pregnancy.‘‖54 
Before McFee, Ohio courts disagreed on what facts a plaintiff must 
show to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.  Some 
courts held the plaintiff must ―assert that (1) she was pregnant, (2) 
discharged, and (3) replaced by nonpregnant personnel.‖55  On the other 
hand, some courts held that to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination under § 4112.02, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she 
was pregnant, (2) she was discharged, and (3) a nonpregnant employee 
similar in ability or inability to work was treated differently.56  Once a 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 
to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.57  
If the defendant provides a legitimate reason for termination, the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason was a pretext 




 52. Frantz v. Beechmont Pet Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); McConaughy v. 
Boswell Oil Co., 711 N.E.2d 719, 725 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); Dirham v. Van Wert Cnty. Hosp., No. 
3:99cv07485, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6417 at *9–12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2000); Woodworth v. Concord 
Mgmt., 164 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Morse v. Sudan, Inc., No. 66032, 1994 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 3480 at *8–9 (8th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1994). 
 53. McConaughy, 711 N.E.2d at 725. 
 54. Woodworth, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 985. 
 55. Dirham, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11; see also Frantz, 690 N.E.2d at 901; Marvel 
Consultants, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 639 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 56. Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable, 812 N.E.2d 976, 983–84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); see 
also Priest v. TFH-EB, Inc., 711 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (―While Ohio courts often 
employ the ‗comparable employee‘ analysis for the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in 
pregnancy discrimination cases, at least one Ohio court has used the ‗replacement‘ analysis to determine 
if the prima facie test was met.‖). 
 57. Hollingsworth, 812 N.E.2d at 984. 
 58. Id. 
9
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III. MCFEE V. NURSING CARE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA 
Tiffany McFee had worked for Pataskala Oaks for eight months when 
she requested leave due to a pregnancy-related condition.
59
  However, 
Pataskala Oaks‘s leave policy required employees have at least one year 
of service before they could take leave.
60
  As the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals noted, assuming a normal gestation period, McFee was five to 
seven weeks pregnant at the time she was hired.
61
  She was fired three 
days after she gave birth and six days after she went on leave.
62
 
McFee filed a charge with the (OCRC) alleging unlawful termination 
due to her pregnancy.  The OCRC held that McFee‘s termination 
violated Ohio‘s laws against pregnancy discrimination because 
maternity leave caused her termination.
63
  The Licking County Court of 
Common Pleas reversed the OCRC, citing Ohio Administrative Code 
§ 4112-5-05(G)(4),
64
 which provides that ―Employment 
policies . . . shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy and childbirth 
on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary 
leaves of absence of the same classification under such employment 
policies . . . .‖
65
  The trial court held that termination of a pregnant 
employee due solely to her need for maternity leave was not a 
termination because of pregnancy.
66
 
On appeal, the OCRC argued that under O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G)(2), 
an employer must provide reasonable maternity leave regardless of its 
leave policy.
67
  The Fifth District Court of Appeals agreed, holding that 
O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G)(2) required employers to provide maternity 
leave for a reasonable period of time, consistent with the purpose of 
 
 59. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (Ohio 2010). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n., 910 N.E.2d 482, 483 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 
2010). 
 62. Nursing Care Mgmt.of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 483. 
 63. Id. at 483–484. 
 64. Id. 
 65. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(4) (2010). 
 66. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 488–89. 
 67. Id. 
10
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Chapter 4112 to promote equal employment opportunities for women.
68
 
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and held that a uniformly applied 
minimum-length-of-service leave requirement did not violate Chapter 
4112.
69
  The court cited federal cases holding that the PDA did not 
require preferential treatment for pregnant employees.
70
 Since 
§ 4112.01(B) mirrors the PDA, case law interpreting the PDA is 
generally applicable to the Ohio provision.
71
  Therefore, the court 
reasoned that Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112 also did not require the 
preferential treatment of providing leave to pregnant employees when 




The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed with the appellate court that 
McFee‘s termination constituted direct evidence of discrimination.
73
  
The court ruled that direct evidence of discrimination is ―evidence that 
proves that discrimination has occurred without requiring further 
inferences.‖
74
  Since the parties agreed that McFee was terminated 
because she took leave from work even though she was not eligible, 
McFee did not present direct evidence of discrimination.
75
  The court 
concluded that the employer‘s leave policy was not direct evidence of 
sex discrimination because it is ―pregnancy-blind,‖ meaning the policy 
does not treat pregnant employees differently from employees ―not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.‖
76
  In so holding, 
the court rejected the OCRC‘s argument that the ―treated the same‖ 
clause of § 4112.01(B) must be read separate from the first sentence 
prohibiting termination ―because of or on the basis of pregnancy.‖
77
  
Instead, the court held that the treated-the-same clause is an explanation 
 
 68. Id. at 488–89. 
 69. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ohio 2010). 
 70. Id. at 1073. 
 71. Id. (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Join Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights 
Comm‘n, 421 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1981)). 
 72. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1073. 
 73. Id. 
 74. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Ohio 2010) (quoting 
Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 446 F.3d 637, 640–641 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 75. Id. at 1077. 
 76. Id. (citing Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640–641 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 77. Id. at 1073. 
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and application of the because-of-pregnancy clause.
78
  According to the 
court, both sentences served the same goal: ―to ensure that employees 
who are pregnant are not discriminated against on the basis of 
pregnancy.‖
79
  The court reasoned that ―[t]o hold otherwise would be to 
require that employers treat pregnant employees more favorably than 
other employees.‖
80
  Thus, the court deemed the employer‘s pregnancy-
blind policy was not direct evidence of discrimination and stated that 




When construing the OCRC rules, the court interpreted O.A.C. 
§ 4112-5-05(G)(5) to be incongruent with (G)(2).  The court relied on 
paragraph (G)(5) as evidence that (G)(2) does not mandate reasonable 
leave because it contemplates that a uniform minimum-length-of-service 
requirement for leave eligibility is permissible.  According to statutory 
construction, the court held it must resolve the ambiguity in a manner 
that gives effect to both provisions.
82
  This led the court to rule that 
O.A.C. 4112-5-05(G)(2) ―must mean that when an employee is 
otherwise eligible for leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that 




The Supreme Court of Ohio further held that O.A.C. § 4112-5-05(G) 
cannot require employers to provide maternity leave because that 
mandate would exceed the statutory authority of the Civil Rights 
Commission.
84
  Claiming the OCRC‘s interpretation requires 
preferential treatment for pregnant workers, the court ruled the 
regulations exceed the public policy Chapter 4112, which is for 





 78. Id. at 1074. 
 79. Id. 
 80. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (Ohio 2010). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1076. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1075. 
 85. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (Ohio 2010). 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
This Part will discuss the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s decision in McFee 
and will analyze it as an example of the inadequate protection current 
discrimination laws provide to pregnant employees.  First, subpart A 
will argue that the result of the court‘s decision is inconsistent with 
§ 4112.02(A).  Second, subpart B will show that the contemplation of a 
one-year service requirement in (G)(5) need not be interpreted to take 
the reasonable leave mandate out of (G)(2) and (G)(6).  Third, subpart C 
will examine McFee in light of the purpose of the PDA, which is to 
promote equal employment opportunity for women.  Fourth, subpart D 
will consider in more detail how a pregnancy-blind policy can still be 
discriminatory.  Finally, subpart E will conclude with a brief comparison 
of Ohio‘s post-McFee pregnancy leave policy to that of other states and 
developed nations. 
A. McFee Is Inconsistent With Revised Code Section 4112.02(A) 
Prior to McFee, federal and Ohio courts had held that the Ohio 
Administrative Code ―plainly indicates that new mothers must be 
granted a reasonable leave on account of childbearing‖ and that denial 
of such leave ―is, in effect, terminating the employee because of her 
pregnancy.‖
86
  In McFee‘s case, if not for her pregnancy, it is fair to 
assume she would not have been terminated.  The only way the 
prohibition on discrimination in § 4112.02(A) can be followed is by 
adopting the Ohio Civil Rights Commission‘s interpretation of O.A.C. 
4112-5-05(G)(2).  A no-leave policy is virtually impossible for a 




Section 4112.02(A), in conjunction with § 4112.01(B), explicitly 
prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a pregnant applicant because 
 
 86. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 (Ohio 
2010). 
 87. Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 
567, 582 (2010). 
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of pregnancy or from firing an employee because of her pregnancy.
88
  
However, a one-year minimum service requirement for leave eligibility 
allows employers to terminate or refuse to hire pregnant employees or 
applicants due solely to the need for maternity leave that directly results 
from pregnancy.  Failing to require employers to provide pregnancy 
leave violates § 4112.02 by condoning the termination of employees 
because of their pregnancy. 
In addition, § 4112.08 requires courts to construe Chapter 4112 
―liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes, and any law 
inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply.‖
89
  
Furthermore, § 1.11 provides that ―[r]emedial laws and all proceedings 
under them shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object 
and assist the parties in obtaining justice.‖
90
  Accordingly, courts should 
interpret Ohio‘s pregnancy discrimination law to fulfill its purpose—
protecting pregnant workers—and construe the law liberally to require 
maternity leave for a reasonable period of time.  To deny maternity 
leave is to deny pregnant women substantial equality of employment 
opportunity contrary to the goals of Chapter 4112.  Therefore, the Fifth 
District Ohio Court of Appeals correctly held that McFee‘s termination 
constituted direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination.
91
 
B. The Reasonable Leave Required by Ohio Administrative Code 
Sections 4112-5-05(G)(2) and (G)(6) Was Consistent With (G)(5) and 
Was Within the Scope of Revised Code Section 4112.02(A) 
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on O.A.C. 4112-5-05(G)(5) as 
evidence that (G)(2) does not require reasonable leave because it 
contemplates that a uniform minimum-length-of-service requirement for 
leave eligibility is permissible.  According to statutory construction, the 
court held it must resolve the ambiguity in a manner that gives effect to 
both provisions.
92
  This led the court to rule that O.A.C. 4112-5-
05(G)(2) ―must mean that when an employee is otherwise eligible for 
 
 88. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.08 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 90. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 91. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 489. 
 92. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1076 (Ohio 2010). 
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leave, the employer cannot lawfully terminate that employee for 
violating a policy that provides no leave‖ for pregnancy or a related 
condition.
93
  However, as noted by the Ohio Court of Appeals for the 
First District in McConaughy, (G)(6) explicitly states, 
―[n]otwithstanding paragraphs (G)(1) to (G)(5) of this rule, if the 
employer has no leave policy, childbearing must be considered by the 
employer to be a justification for leave of absence for a female 
employee for a reasonable period of time.‖
94
  The O.A.C. provided this 
separate section for the sole purpose of clarifying that reasonable 
maternity leave is required and that any apparent inconsistency in 
provisions (G)(1) through (G)(5) does not override this requirement. 
Additionally, the alleged tension between (G)(2) and (G)(5) can be 
eradicated without taking the leave requirement out of (G)(2).  The 
clause contemplating a minimum length of service requirement in (G)(5) 
is preceded by the words ―[f]or example.‖
95
  This introductory phrase 
demonstrates that the provision intends to clarify what is required when 
an employer elects to offer disability leave.  Contemplating this situation 
does not negate what § 4112-5-05 requires in other situations, especially 
since the provisions require the same thing—that employers offer their 
employees pregnancy leave.  This is especially apparent when 
considering the preceding sentence, and what the minimum length of 
service contemplation seeks to illuminate: ―When, under the employer's 
leave policy the female employee would qualify for leave, then 
childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justification for 
leave of absence . . . .‖
96
  Paragraph (G)(5) can be interpreted as 
requiring employers who offer leave to also offer pregnancy leave, 
while (G)(2) and (G)(6) provide that even if an employer does not offer 
other leave, it must offer pregnancy leave.  The separate provisions 
cover different situations, but all require employers to offer reasonable 
maternity leave.  In addition, as the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
noted, ―[A] reviewing court must give deference to an administrative 
agency‘s interpretation of its own rules and regulations where such 
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the plain language of the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(6) (2010). 
 95. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(G)(5) (2010). 
 96. Id. 
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statute and rule.‖
97
  The Supreme Court of Ohio, on the other hand, 
found that interpreting the OCRC rules as mandating pregnancy leave 
violates the Ohio constitution by exceeding the statutory authority 
granted by the Ohio General Assembly.  Specifically, the rules thus 
interpreted would ―expand the public policy set by the legislature‖ that 
pregnant employees be treated the same as other employees, not 
preferentially.
98
  As a result, the court found it must interpret the rules as 
only requiring employers to treat pregnant employees the same as other 
employees similar in their ability to work. 
C. The Decision in McFee Contradicts the Purpose of § 4112.02(A) 
While the Supreme Court of Ohio claimed the purposes of O.R.C. 
§ 4112.02(A) and the PDA are to treat pregnant persons the same as 
nonpregnant persons, a broader purpose of Title VII and Chapter 4112 is 
to promote the equal employment opportunity of women.  Section 
4112.02 is similar to the PDA, and the court has held that federal case 
law interpreting Title VII is generally applicable to Chapter 4112 
cases.
99
  Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals took note of a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision on a similar issue.  In California Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a California law requiring employers to provide unpaid pregnancy 
disability leave was not inconsistent with Title VII because: (1) the PDA 
was intended by Congress to provide a floor, not a ceiling, for 
pregnancy benefits and (2) the leave mandate was in line with Title 
VII‘s intent to promote equal employment opportunity.
100
  The Fifth 
District Court of Appeals quoted Justice Stevens‘s concurring opinion in 
Guerra, noting that while the plain words of the PDA seem to mandate 
treating pregnant employees the same as other employees, the U.S. 
Supreme Court previously rejected that argument and held that Title VII 
prohibits all preferential treatment of the disadvantaged classes that the 
 
 97. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 98. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1075. 
 99. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Plumbers & Steamfitters Join 
Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 421 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1981)). 
 100. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987). 
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statute was enacted to protect.
101
  Justice Stevens argued that while the 
statutory language ―seems to mandate treating pregnant employees the 
same as other employees‖ one cannot ―ignore the fact the PDA is a 
definitional section of Title VII's prohibition against gender-based 
discrimination.‖
102
  Justice Stevens refused to accept the proposition 
that the PDA requires absolute neutrality, but instead allows, like 
other parts of Title VII, preferential treatment of the disadvantaged 
class so long as it is consistent with accomplishing the legislative 
goal.
103
 Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission that the reasonable leave requirement in 
paragraph (G)(5) ―is consistent with the goals of the PDA and R.C. 
§ 4112.02 by promoting equal employment opportunity by ensuring that 
women will not lose their jobs on account of pregnancy disability.‖
104
 
The fact that the PDA was a congressional response to Gilbert is 
further evidence that equal employment opportunity is the true goal of 
the legislation.  In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that excluding 
pregnancy from disability coverage was not sex discrimination under 
Title VII because the disparate treatment was not gender-based.
105
  The 
Court considered the distinction in treatment as comparing pregnant and 
nonpregnant persons, not women and men, because men cannot become 
pregnant and not all women will become pregnant.
106
  Since both 
women and men can be nonpregnant, singling out pregnancy is not 
gender discrimination.  This reasoning, as legal scholar Deborah 
Anthony describes, ―represents an intentional self-delusion as to both 
biological and social reality, manifested in a requirement that 
discrimination cannot take place unless similarly situated groups are 
treated differently.‖
107
  The PDA is, therefore, a congressional 
 
 101. Nursing Care Mgmt. of America, Inc., 910 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 293 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 102. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 293–94 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 105. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(k) (2006). 
 106. Id. at 134–35. 
 107. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-
Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & L. 459, 464–65 (2008). 
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instruction to courts to move away from the pregnant-nonpregnant 
distinction used in Gilbert, as well as a congressional recognition that 
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination.  Indeed, the comments 
of PDA sponsor Senator Williams, cited by the Supreme Court in 
Guerra, support this conclusion: ―The entire thrust . . . behind this 
legislation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and 
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to 
full participation in family life.‖
108
  The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled 
the regulations exceed the public policy addressed in § 4112.02 and 
§ 4112.01 because the purpose of those policies is to treat pregnant 
employees the same as nonpregnant employees.
109
  However, if the 
public policy of § 4112.02(A) is, like its corresponding federal 
legislation, to ensure equal employment opportunity for women, then 
the reverse is true: if § 4112-5-05 does not require reasonable maternity 
leave, the rule does not fulfill the statutory duty the OCRC has been 
given by the Ohio General Assembly. 
D. A Pregnancy-Blind Policy Can Still Be Discriminatory 
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled McFee was terminated because she 
took leave for which she was ineligible, not because she was pregnant.  
This is, as the court said, a pregnancy-blind policy, but this policy is also 
discrimination-blind.  Comparing pregnant workers to nonpregnant 
workers disguises the gender discrimination inherent in a situation 
where a woman—and only a woman—can be fired because of 
pregnancy.  A lack of pregnancy leave can place a female employee in a 
position of choosing between her job and the continuation of her 
pregnancy; an implicit ultimatum that the Fifth District Court of Appeals 
noted is ―a dilemma which would never face a male employee in the 
first year of employment.‖
110
  The Fifth District Court of Appeals also 
noted that ―[b]oth sexes are entitled to have a family without losing their 
jobs; to hold otherwise would be to completely ignore the plain 
 
 108. Id. at 466. 
 109. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (Ohio 2010). 
 110. Nursing Care Mgmt. of America, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm‘n, 910 N.E.2d 482, 489 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2009), rev’d sub nom. McFee v. Nursing Care Mgmt. of Am., Inc., 931 N.E.2d 1069 
(Ohio 2010). 
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language of Ohio Admin. Code 4112-5-05(G)(2),‖
111
 and would 
completely counteract the goals of the PDA and Chapter 4112. 
By ignoring how pregnancy affects genders differently, society loses 
sight of why pregnancy protection exists in the first place.  Whether or 
not a woman is pregnant at the time she is hired or knows she is 
pregnant at the time she is hired, McFee holds that she will face 
termination or denial of hire in three scenarios a male employee would 
never encounter.  First, a female applicant could be unknowingly 
pregnant when she accepts a position with an employer operating under 
a one-year no-leave policy.  At some point within her first year, 
assuming her pregnancy continues, she will need time off to give birth 
and could be terminated because she was pregnant.  A second possibility 
is that a female applicant knows she is pregnant when she accepts the 
position and discloses this to the employer.  If the employer refuses to 
hire her because she will not be able to comply with the no-leave policy, 
the employer is in effect refusing to hire her because of her pregnancy.  
Finally, if a new female employee becomes pregnant within her first few 
months of employment, she could face termination for taking leave to 
give birth.  New male employees would not face any of these scenarios, 
demonstrating how the no-leave policy disguises pregnancy 
discrimination and inhibits the equal employment opportunity of 
women.  Even if a woman is neither pregnant nor intending to become 
pregnant at the time she is hired, a no-leave policy in effect compels 
women to guarantee to not become pregnant.  In such a scenario, it 
places a woman in the position of choosing a family or employment, 
which runs counter to the purpose of the legislation. 
The above scenarios demonstrate that comparing pregnant workers to 
nonpregnant workers rather than male employees to female employees 
disguises the gender discrimination inherent in denying maternity leave.  
The Supreme Court of Ohio utilized a pregnant versus nonpregnant 
comparison to show that providing maternity leave, but not other types 
of leave, is preferential treatment.  However, comparing pregnant to 
nonpregnant persons, instead of women to men, allows women to be 
equal only to the extent that they are like men—in this case, to the 
 
 111. Id. 
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extent they are not pregnant.
112
  Comparing how males and females are 
situated differently under the same no-leave policy reveals how 
requiring maternity leave places males and females on equal ground.  It 
places women in the same position as men, i.e., not facing the risk of 
losing a job because of pregnancy. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that McFee had to make her claim 
under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, which required her to 
establish that a nonpregnant employee similar in ability or inability to 
work was treated differently.
113
  However, this reasoning subscribes 
to the pregnant versus nonpregnant comparison used in Gilbert.  
Congress addressed the inadequate protection this distinction 
provides when it enacted the PDA in response to Gilbert.  The PDA‘s 
mandate of equal treatment for pregnant employees has been difficult to 
apply to cases because there is no male equivalent to pregnancy.
114
  In 
addition, using the similarly situated requirement implicitly encourages 
treating different groups of people differently, which contradicts the 
objective of all anti-discrimination laws.
115
  In any event, no other 
employee is truly similarly situated to a pregnant woman forced to 
choose between continuing her pregnancy and keeping her job.  Even 
if one assumes an employee with a similar disability exists, it is less 
likely that the most vulnerable groups of female employees—those 
outside the scope of the FMLA—will be able to find an instance of a 
similarly situated employee at a small employer. 
This difficulty in finding a similarly situated employee is the reason 
some courts have held that women making a claim under the PDA can 
utilize a disparate impact theory.  In Abraham v. Graphic Arts 
International Union, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found an 
employer‘s policy of allowing only a ten-day leave discriminated 
against pregnant employees despite the policy‘s equal application to 
both pregnant and nonpregnant employees.
116
  The court found that the 
policy had a drastic effect on pregnant employees that ―clashes violently 
 
 112. Anthony, supra note 31, at 493. 
 113. McFee, 931 N.E.2d at 1076–1077. 
 114. Sarah Stewart Holland, Comment, Pregnancy in Pieces: The Potential Gap in State and 
Federal Pregnancy Leave, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 443, 461 (2006). 
 115. Anthony, supra note 31, at 492. 
 116. Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int‘l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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with the letter as well as the spirit of Title VII.‖
117
  Under a disparate 
impact theory, an employee can prove discrimination based on the 
disparate impact of a facially neutral policy on a protected group, like 
pregnant women.
118
  Unlike a disparate treatment theory, an employee is 
not required to prove that the employer had a discriminatory motive.
119
  
In a disparate impact case, the employer can defend itself by proving the 
practice is a job-related necessity, but the employee can still prevail if 
she can prove the existence of a lesser discriminatory policy that would 
―serve the employer‘s legitimate interest in ‗efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship.‘‖
120
  However, the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
declared the disparate impact theory applicable to pregnancy 
discrimination claims and lower courts are divided on the issue.
121
  Even 
if an employee is allowed to argue disparate impact, many courts have 
stated the PDA requires only equal treatment of pregnant and 
nonpregnant employees.
122
  Using this comparison, courts are unlikely 
to find evidence of discrimination.
123
 
The Supreme Court noted in Nevada v. Hibbs that when passing the 
FMLA, Congress responded to the failure of the PDA to adequately 
address gender discrimination.
124
  Congress chose to go beyond a strict-
equality approach like that of Title VII, which would not adequately 
address gender discrimination because ―[s]uch a law would allow States 
to provide for no family leave at all.‖
125
  That is the situation for women 
who constitute a disproportionate number of the 46% of workers who 
are not protected by the FMLA and the women who are more likely than 
men to fall below the one-year service requirement.
126
  The strict 
equality, pregnancy-blind approach is not fulfilling the promise of equal 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Sarah Stewart Holland, Comment, Pregnancy in Pieces: The Potential Gap in State and 
Federal Pregnancy Leave, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 443, 451 (2006). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Nev. Dep‘t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003). 
 125. Id. at 738. 
 126. Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-
Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y& L. 459, 475 (2008). 
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employment opportunity for women.  This is demonstrated by the fact 
that women, such as McFee, are terminated because of leave 
necessitated as a direct result of pregnancy.  In Hibbs, the Supreme 
Court made clear that Congress has the authority under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to address family leave needs that have 
precluded women from equal participation in the labor market.  The 
Court further acknowledged that a policy of mere non-discrimination 
would fail to create real employment equality.
127
 
E. Pregnancy Leave in Other States and Countries 
Two states have adopted rules prohibiting termination of employment 
because of pregnancy when an employer offers no leave or inadequate 
leave by regulation,
128
 and three other states require reasonable leave by 
statute.
129
  The scarcity of state laws ensuring equal employment 
opportunity by mandating unpaid leave for pregnant workers is partly 
explained by the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act, even 
though as discussed above, the FMLA fails to protect a great number of 
workers, which disproportionately include women.  Some states have 
passed laws that protect workers who fall outside the scope of the 
FMLA, like California‘s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which 
requires all private employers with five or more employees to provide 
up to four months of unpaid, job-protected leave for pregnancy-related 
medical conditions, including childbirth.
130
  Congress has the ability to 
take further action to protect pregnant workers from losing their jobs. 
The United States is the only modern country worldwide without paid 
 
 127. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735–38. 
 128. HAW. CODE. R. § 12-46-108 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-30-020(4)(b) 
(2010) (noting the disparate impact that inadequate leave policies have on women, stating: ―There may 
be circumstances when the application of the employer's general leave policy to pregnancy or childbirth 
will not afford equal opportunity for women and men. One circumstance would be where the employer 
allows no leave for any sickness or other disability by any employee, or so little leave time that a 
pregnant woman must terminate employment. Because such a leave policy has a disparate impact on 
women, it is an unfair practice, unless the policy is justified by business necessity.‖). 
 129. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 2010), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (2010), MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 49-2-310 (2010). 
 130. CAL. GOV‘T CODE §12926(d), 12945(a) (West 2010). 
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maternity leave for employees.
131
  As early as 1989, most Western 
countries ―provided paid leave, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom.‖
132
  Many workers in the United States, however, do 
not even have unpaid leave available and may face termination as a 
result of pregnancy if they are part of the 46% of workers not covered 
by the FMLA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Without the availability of disparate impact theory under the PDA 
and state statutes based on the PDA, workers need new legislation to 
prevent pregnancy discrimination.  Until Congress makes the FMLA 
more inclusive, states have the responsibility to protect their workers 
against sex and pregnancy discrimination. 
Congress, and states like Ohio with PDA language in their 
employment discrimination statutes, could amend the PDA to codify the 
disparate impact theory and make clear that women are protected against 
job discrimination even when employers have a no-leave policy.  The 
same is true for FMLA and state laws based on the FMLA that can be 
amended to provide all employees a reasonable amount of leave to bear 
a child and physically recover.
133
  In Ohio, the legislature could restore 
the protections the Ohio Administrative Code provided to women by 
codifying the language of Ohio Administrative Code § 4112-5-05(G)(6): 
―[I]f the employer has no leave policy, childbearing must be considered 
by the employer to be a justification for leave of absence for a female 
employee for a reasonable period of time.‖
134
  Until such actions are 
taken, the goals of Title VII and state companion legislation will not be 
realized, and employment inequality between the genders will persist. 
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